The Quiet Contest

So, Rolls-Royce won a competition that most people didn’t even know was running. The prize? The chance to be the first company to build small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) in the UK, part of a government push to put Britain at the frontier of affordable nuclear energy technology. Sounds like a win-win, right?

The Dangerous Fiction Behind the PR

But as the old adage goes, never let the truth get in the way of a good story. If you buy into the PR and government spin, this appears to be a happy tale. For me, as a natural pessimist, though, the problem was clear almost from the start, with a very obvious sting.

From Submarines to Your Backyard

Cheap power, what’s not to like? The spin doctors want you to believe inexpensive, unlimited nuclear power is just around the corner, thanks to SMRs, with their roots in naval technology, similar nuclear reactors already power submarines. SMRs are essentially scaled-down versions of those reactors.

The Security Conundrum

SMRs will mostly be factory-built systems produced to a single design on a production line. These factory-built “modules” will then be assembled on-site. Speaking of such “sites” if you’ve ever visited His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde or Devonport, you’ll have noticed the heavy security. The same goes for the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in Berkshire, where Trident Mk4/A Holbrook warheads are made.

The reason is simple. Those armed MoD police or Royal Navy guards aren’t there for show or to look pretty. They’re there to stop anyone from messing with nuclear reactors, weapons, or materials. Why? Because such stuff is seriously dangerous and must be kept out of any idle hands. We all know what happens otherwise.

The Thin Blue (Nuclear) Line

It’s the same with our current nuclear power stations; they are sensitive and vulnerable assets that need to be protected from a range of threats that sadly include terrorism. The job of guarding these sites rests with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC), a specialist police force funded by the nuclear industry itself. It is responsible for providing law enforcement and security at all relevant nuclear sites and for securing nuclear materials in transit within the United Kingdom.

The CNC is an excellent police force that is specialised, motivated, and, as you would expect, extremely well-armed. Its infrastructure is deliberately weighted towards a body of permanently armed professional police officers that directly reflects the current threat assessment. A model predominantly defensive and geoconfigured for a small number of large licensed nuclear sites, along with the occasional international transport of nuclear materials.

Security Scaled to Disaster

SMRs will fundamentally change the nature of such policing because the current model relies on soon-to-be outdated assumptions about large, remote sites requiring a small, specialist, armed police force. SMRs not only move the goalposts but also create many more of them. And that has massive implications for the way they are policed and protected.

The Urban Nuclear Gamble

The UK plans to refocus its energy strategy by moving away from traditional large-scale nuclear plants, typically sited in remote locations, and instead rapidly constructing Rolls-Royce’s small modular reactors (SMRs) in or near populated areas by 2050.

That “refocus” poses many more questions than it proposes to answer. How do you manage many smaller yet still secure CNC police stations and facilities? If, as intended, SMRs are sited in populated and urban locations, how do you incorporate and facilitate all the complex layers of policing infrastructure and security logistics needed to protect those smaller multiple sites?

The Inescapable Math of Vulnerability

Just because the footprint of a site has been reduced, the need, desire and necessity to protect it has not. Indeed, you might even argue that the threat level has indeed increased. Now, instead of a few well-protected and policed sites, you have many locations that all need the same levels of protection. More variables, more risk, it’s that simple.

Not only do you need to replicate the same level of armed infrastructure and security logistics only this time on a much smaller site. Yet, as the sites get smaller, the problems get bigger.

More magazines with ammunition storage and policing. More armouries to store more weapons. More secure parking for armed vehicles. Sadly, we are not talking about a Tardis.

The Coming Security Crunch

Then, of course, more policing needs more police. Increasing the number of sites also increases the number of officers required exponentially. How do you integrate with local police forces? How do you deal with joint threats such as civil disorder?

The Unanswerable Questions

The closer you look, the more issues you find. Plus, how on earth do you deal with the concept of exclusion zones in an urban context? And finally, the sting in the tail: who and how do you pay for all of that?